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ABSTRACT
A security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) problem is regularly solved
by system operators in electric power networks to make day-ahead and real-
time dispatch decisions. Preventive SCED is conservative and requires dis-
patch decisions that are secure against any single component failure. Cor-
rective (recourse) actions can significantly reduce operational costs. Even
with linear power flow models, corrective SCED poses significant computa-
tional challenges owing to an increase in the dimensionality arising from ad-
ditional recourse decisions and the number of contingencies to guard against.
This thesis analyzes the benefits of allowing recourse actions for simple net-
works and tackles the computational challenges of solving the problem at
scale through a decomposition of the problem via a critical region explo-
ration technique that exploits the problem structure using properties of multi-
parametric linear programming. This thesis concludes with numerical results
on various IEEE test networks.
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An economic dispatch (ED) problem seeks to minimize dispatch costs, sub-
ject to the engineering constraints of a power grid, e.g., capacity limits on
power generation and transmission line power flows. The resulting dispatch,
however, may not be feasible in the event that one or more components in
the network fails. System operators often seek a dispatch that is robust to all
single potential outages. This is referred to as the N−1 security criterion for
an N -component power system. That is, they impose additional constraints
on the dispatch to maintain reliable operation when the power system faces
the failure of a single transmission line, transformer, or generator failures.
This enhanced formulation of the ED problem with additional constraints is
referred to as the security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) problem.
SCED problems are routinely solved in today’s power system operation - in
clearing day-ahead markets and in making real-time dispatch decisions. A
SCED problem tries to balance between the system operator’s two conflicting
goals - minimize system costs and maintain reliability of power delivery under
contingencies. This thesis provides an analytical comparison of the various
formulations of SCED that have appeared in the literature over simple net-
works, extends the formulation in a way that better captures the tradeoff
between cost and reliability, and finally prescribes an algorithm to deal with
the computational difficulties of SCED with linearized power flow models.
SCED formulations abound in the literature, the first of which is preventive-
SCED (P-SCED). This formulation imposes that the dispatch remain feasible
within existing transmission line and generator capacity limits for all opera-
tional components in every contingency (cf. [1]). P-SCED does not consider
potential recourse actions one can take when an outage occurs. The result is
overly conservative and this formulation offers immediate extensions.
Notably, corrective-SCED (C-SCED) seeks to expand upon P-SCED by
allowing active network components to respond to a contingency (cf. [2]).
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It allows re-dispatch of generators with fast-ramping capabilities and some
even allow partial load-shedding. A variety of formulations for C-SCED
exist. More recent ones, e.g., in [3, 4, 5], have considered potential relaxation
of transmission line limits immediately after a contingency occurs. Stricter
limits are again enforced when recourse actions are taken. Section 3.3 offers
a comparative analysis of the various SCED formulations on a simple 2-bus
power network example, very much in line with the analysis in [6].
The authors in [3, 4, 5] seek to minimize the cost of nominal dispatch
but ignore the costs associated with recourse actions. Recourse decisions –
especially load shedding – can be costly when modeled via a value of lost load.
To remedy that, the authors in [7] associate probabilities to contingencies
and propose to minimize the expected dispatch costs across scenarios. The
formulation is extended to one that aims to minimize the conditional value
at risk (CVaR) of said costs. CVaRα of a random variable measures the
expected loss in the α%-worst outcomes. As will be clear in the formulation
in Chapter 3, the SO can express its preference in trading off cost versus
reliability through its choice of α in our formulation.
Optimizing the recourse decision in each contingency requires the solution
of an ED problem that is coupled to the nominal dispatch through ramping
constraints of various generators. Regardless of formulation, the problem de-
scription of C-SCED is many times larger than a nominal ED problem. Scal-
ably solving such problems on practical power networks then becomes chal-
lenging, especially for computing real-time dispatch decisions within strict
time constraints. Two approaches have been advocated to deal with the
attending computational difficulties. The first approach pre-filters contin-
gencies; see [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] for a non-exhaustive list. In the second
approach, one decomposes the C-SCED problem into multiple, significantly
smaller optimization problems that can be solved in parallel and aggregated
appropriately, e.g., see an accelerated augmented Lagrangian based method
in [15] and using Bender’s decomposition in [16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. A decom-
position based approach is adopted and a critical region exploration (CRE)
algorithm for C-SCED and its risk-sensitive variant is presented in Section
4.1, that has recently been proposed for multi-area ED problems in [21].
With linear power flow models, C-SCED is a linear program, where the ED
problem for deciding optimal recourse actions in each contingency becomes
a linear program linearly parameterized by the nominal dispatch, where the
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nominal dispatch refers to the dispatch under no contingencies. A method
that systematically explores the space of nominal dispatch to arrive at the
optimal solution is developed, leveraging properties of multi-parametric lin-
ear programming. The ED problems for the recourse decisions can be par-
allelized, leading to speed-ups compared to centralized solution techniques.
The efficiency of this algorithm is numerically explored on various IEEE test
networks in Chapter 5.





In this section, the formulation for the nominal economic dispatch problem
is presented. The notation for the nominal case is then used to develop the
security-constrained counterparts.
2.1 The nominal ED problem
Consider an electrical power network on n buses, labeled 1, . . . , n with m
transmission lines. Let each bus be equipped with a dispatchable generator
and a nominal load. Let g ∈ Rn and d ∈ Rn denote the vectors of nodal
power generation and nominal demands, respectively. A linearized power
flow model using DC approximations is assumed throughout.1
The (directional) power flows over the transmission lines become linear
maps of the vector of nodal power injections x, given by Hx. Here, H ∈
R2m×n denotes the injection shift-factor matrix that depends on the topology
of the power network and the admittances of the transmission lines. Denoting
the limits on the (directed) power flows by f ∈ R2m, the set of allowable nodal




∣∣Hx ≤ f ,1ᵀx = 0} , (2.1)
where 1 ∈ Rn is a vector of all ones. The equality constraint, 1ᵀx = 0,
captures the balance of demand and supply of power across the network.
The DC approximations deem the voltage magnitudes to be at their nomi-
nal values, ignore transmission line losses, and assume voltage phase angle
differences across neighboring buses to be small. One can utilize real-time
measurements to estimate H , e.g., in [22].
1All formulations can easily be extended to any linear power flow model.
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Assume a linear cost of production cᵀg for producing g from dispatchable
generators that can vary their outputs within G = [G,G]. The lack of a
generator at a bus i can be modeled by letting Gi = Gi = 0. With the above






subject to g ∈ G, g − d ∈ P.
(2.2)
2.2 Existing security-constrained ED formulations
Problem (2.2) minimizes system operational costs subject to network con-
straints. However, the generation profile does not guard against possible
component failures. To define a security-constrained variant, consider a col-
lection of scenarios, denoted 1, . . . , K, each of which corresponds to a single
transmission line failure. A line outage alters the network topology and man-
ifests in the ED problem as a different injection shift factor matrix H k. The
formulation of the security-constrained variant depends on possible recourse
actions one can take in each contingency. The following section presents dif-
ferent formulations of security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) prob-
lems and discusses their pros and cons.
2.2.1 Preventive-SCED
Perhaps the most conservative of approaches, preventive SCED, stipulates
that g must be able to satisfy the nominal demands even after any single line






subject to g ∈ G, g − d ∈ P, g − d ∈ Pk,
k = 1, . . . , K.
(2.3)
Here, Pk is the feasible injection region in the k-th contingency, that is iden-
tical to (2.1), except that H is replaced by H k. It effectively shrinks the
set of generation profiles, resulting in higher generation costs. See [6] for an
analysis of the additional costs for simple network topologies.
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2.2.2 Corrective-SCED
The corrective counterpart allows for recourse decisions, and is therefore able
to provide security against outages at a possibly lower operational cost than
P-SCED. Various formulations of the corrective variant C-SCED are known;




subject to g ∈ G, g − d ∈ P, g − d ∈ PkDA,
g + δgk ∈ G, g + δgk − d ∈ PkSE, |δgk| ≤∆g,
for k = 1, . . . , K
(2.4)
over g, δg1, . . . , δgK . The deviation of the supply from the generators in
contingency k from the nominal case is denoted by δgk. Here, ∆g models the
ramping constraints. The inequality |δgk| ≤ ∆g is interpreted elementwise,
i.e., |δgki | ≤ ∆g,i.
Apart from allowing recourse decisions, notice that (2.4) allows post-contingency
but pre-recourse nodal power injections to take values in PkDA, and those dur-
ing the recourse action to take values in PkSE, where
Pk ⊂ PkSE ⊂ PkDA.
Subscript DA and SE stand for drastic action and short-term emergency lim-
its, respectively. Sets PkDA,PkSE are essentially identical to Pk with larger line
capacity limits. These capacities are primarily defined by thermal consider-
ations of transmission lines and transformers. Such components can usually
withstand power flows higher than their rated values for short time periods
– drastic action limits for about 5 minutes and short-term emergency limits
for about 15 minutes. Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of these limits with
the addition of the long-term emergency (LE) limit. These dynamic ratings
ensure that the line does not exceed its maximum thermal capacity over the










Figure 2.1: An example of ( ) dynamic lines ratings based on [23] with






To gain a more nuanced handle on the the tradeoff between procurement
costs and reliability of power delivery, now expand the formulation of C-
SCED (2.4). Allow load shedding and consider a risk-sensitive objective
function that accounts for recourse costs. The proposed formulation utilizes
the conditional value at risk (CVaR) in defining the objective function of the
R-SCED problem. Section 3.1 briefly explains this risk measure before the
formulation of R-SCED is presented in Section 3.2.
3.1 A brief introduction to conditional value at risk












Figure 3.1: The probability density function of some cost where the shaded
region denotes the tail of the distribution occurring with probability 0.05.
The conditional value at risk (CVaR) is a risk measure that maps a random
cost to a scalar value. This risk measure provides a parameter α that captures
one’s willingness to accept high losses for the sake of profit. To express this
formally, consider a random cost, x . The CVaRα [x ] denotes the expected
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cost of the (1− α) fraction of highest cost outcomes, or
CVaRα [x ] := E
[
x |x ≥ F−1(1− α)
]
,
where F is the cumulative distribution function of x and E denotes the ex-
pected value over that distribution. Figure 3.1 provides an example for some
probability distribution of the random cost, x . The shaded region denotes
the tail of the distribution occurring with probability 0.05, and CVaR0.95[x ]
computes the expected value over this tail distribution. Observe that CVaR
computes the expected value of x when α = 0. As α increases, only higher
and higher cost scenarios are considered, so that if α increases to 1 only the
highest cost scenario is considered.
Optimization using CVaR first found appeal in financial literature for port-
folio risk-mitigation [24]. More recently, it has been proposed for a number
of power systems applications. In [25], the author proposes using a CVaR
objective to determine self-scheduling for power producers under price un-
certainty. Several papers use CVaR-based constraints to ensure lines remain
within ratings under uncertainty due to renewable generation [26, 27, 28].
The risk-sensitive SCED problem formulation in Section 3.2 penalizes the
conditional value at risk of the dispatch costs across all contingencies. Cost
in any contingency depends on two factors – the dispatch decisions and the
realized contingency. For a given dispatch, the cost is a random variable
defined over the set of possible contingencies. The expectation and CVaR
of this random variable can easily be computed. Optimizing over the CVaR
of the dispatch cost is equivalent to determining the dispatch decisions for
which the CVaR of cost is minimized. The result is the dispatch for which
the cost in the (1 − α) fraction of the most expensive contingencies is the
lowest.
3.2 Risk-sensitive SCED
Let the satisfied nodal demand be allowed to vary between a minimum load
level d and the nominal d. Denote the amount of load shed as δdk ∈ [0, d −
d] := ∆d. Associate probabilities p ∈ RK to the contingencies, where p0 :=
1 − 1ᵀp represents the probability of the nominal state. Define the risk-
9





g + C(δg, δd)
]
, (3.1a)
subject to g ∈ G, g − d ∈ P, (3.1b)
g − d ∈ PkDA, (3.1c)
g + δgk ∈ G, (3.1d)
g + δgk − d + δdk ∈ PkSE, (3.1e)
|δgk| ≤∆g, δdk ∈∆d, (3.1f)
for each k = 1, . . . , K,
over g, δg, δd. Here, δg, δd denote the collection of the respective vari-
ables across all contingencies. Additionally, C(δg, δd) is the recourse cost,
assuming a contingency occurs. It is a random variable and takes the value





in contingency k. Here, v measures the vector of nodal values of lost load
(VoLL).1 The formulation in (3.1) generalizes that in [7] that seeks to mini-
mize expected recourse costs. Instead, (3.1) minimizes its CVaR, the condi-
tional value at risk.
Notice that the values of lost load are usually higher than generation costs
[29]. Therefore, the larger the α (or α′), the less the system operator is
inclined to shed load and thereby prioritize reliability. As a result, RSCED
provides the operator a better handle to explore the tradeoff between dispatch
cost and reliability of power delivery.
Next, consider a property of RSCED, the proof of which proves useful in
devising an algorithm to solve it in Section 4.1.
Proposition 1. The optimal cost of (3.1) is piecewise affine in α′ over
any interval in R+. Additionally, the optimal nominal dispatch g∗ remains
constant over sub-intervals where the optimal cost is affine.
Proof. Observe that cTg +C(δg, δd) takes values in a discrete set with prob-
abilities p. Letting C0 = 0 and p0 = 1 − 1Tp for the nominal case, the
1The cost structure can be altered to distinguish between different costs for regulation













cTg + Ck(δgk, δdk)− z
]+}
. (3.2)







subject to yk ≥ 0,
yk ≥ cᵀg + Ck(δgk, δdk)− z,
(3.1b)− (3.1f),
for each k = 1, . . . , K,
(3.3)
where y := (y0, . . . , yK)






















subject to Ax0 ≤ b,
Akx0 +Ekxk ≤ bk,
k = 1, . . . , K,
for suitably definedA,b,Ak,Ek, bk, c0, ck. This is a parametric linear program
linearly parameterized by α′. The proof then follows from [30, Theorem 7.2].
3.3 An illustrative 2-bus network example
This section considers a simple 2-bus network. The solutions of the R-SCED
problem are computed and compared with the solutions of the P-SCED and
C-SCED formulations.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of nominal dispatch and its cost under various ED
formulations.
Method g∗1 (MW/hr) g
∗
2 (MW/hr) Nominal Cost ($/hr)
ED 20.0 0.0 20.0
P-SCED 15.0 5.0 25.0
C-SCED 17.25 2.75 22.75
C-SCEDaug 18.75 1.25 21.75
R-SCED (0.1) 18.75 1.25 21.25
R-SCED (0.9) 17.25 2.75 22.75
Recall that C-SCED (2.4) adds flexibility to P-SCED (2.3) in two ways – it
relaxes the line capacity constraints immediately after a contingency occurs
and allows generators to alter their outputs within a short period of time. We
now analyze the impact of these flexibilities on the cost of nominal dispatch








Figure 3.2: A two-bus network example.
Now consider the solution of ED, P-SCED, C-SCED, and R-SCED on
the 2-bus network example in Figure 3.2. Consider the parameter values
c1 =$1/MW, c2 = $2/MW. Thus, generator at bus 1 is cheaper than that
at bus 2. Let ∆g1 = 0.25 MW/min, ∆g2 = 0.2 MW/min, i.e., the cheaper
generator is more flexible. Let both buses have identical demands of 10
MW, and assume uniform value of lost load of $30/MW at both buses. The
transmission line capacities are given by f1 = 5 MW and f2 = 7 MW. Assume
identical probability of line failures, given by p1 = p2 = 0.01. Finally, let
fDA = 1.75f and f SE = 1.25f . Table 3.1 captures the nominal dispatch cost
under various formulations of ED on the 2-bus example.
Consider a special case of C-SCED denoted by C-SCEDaug that is aug-
mented to allow for potential load shed and minimizes the expected cost
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of generation including the costs associated with regulation and load shed
through the value of lost load. This mimics the formulation provided in this
text except that the objective is in expectation and not CVaR.
Observe the R-SCED solution for low α recovers the C-SCED solution
minimizing expected cost with load shed. Additionally, as α increases to
1, the R-SCED solution reduces to the C-SCED case without load shed.
Note that for general power networks, the R-SCED solution is not equal
to the C-SCED without load shed. The R-SCED formulation for high α
weighs regulation as well as load shed more heavily than nominal generation
resulting in different results.
Following Proposition 1, Figure 3.3 shows nominal dispatch cost and total
load shed are piecewise constant. Also, as α increases, the nominal dispatch
cost increases and the quantity of load shed decreases, thereby demonstrating
α as a tunable parameter to trade-off between cost and network reliability.



































Figure 3.3: The effect of α on (a) nominal dispatch cost and (b) total load
shed. Each plot denotes the 2-bus example augmented with ( ) no
augmentations, ( ) dispatch cost at bus 2 reduced to c2 = 1.5, ( )
VoLL increased to v = 40$/MW, ( ) generation ramp limits reduced to
∆g1 = 0.2 MW and ∆g2 = 0.15 MW, ( ) drastic action limit set to
fDA = 1.5f , and ( ) reduced higher capacity line limit f2 = 6 MW.
The R-SCED problem balances recourse cost associated with both regu-
lation and load shed with nominal cost of generation. The importance of
this distinction is illustrated in the case when cost of expensive generation
decreases and, by extension, the cost of the associated regulation decreases.
Notice, in this example, the cost of nominal generation exceeds that of the
nominal case briefly and the cost of nominal generation increases for high α
despite no change in load shed. The former results from the relatively higher
value of lost load, which reduces earlier. The latter is the result of R-SCED
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balancing the cost associated with regulation with the nominal cost. R-
SCED prioritized its decrease over reducing regulation because of the higher




From Proposition 1, R-SCED can be reformulated as a linear program (LP).
A similar procedure can be used to reformulate C-SCED as an LP, however
the precise details are omitted for brevity. Either linear program is challeng-
ing to solve due to its large size for practical power systems. To illustrate,
consider for example the Polish power system with 2383 buses, 2869 lines, 327
generators, and 1817 loads. The nominal ED problem is over 327 variables
and 6447 linear constraints. By comparison, the C-SCED can be formu-
lated over 947319 variables and 28949071 linear constraints, while R-SCED
requires an even greater 6212249 variables and 28954865 linear constraints.
According to [20], the resulting linear program, due to its size, is not solvable
by traditional LP methods. This is especially true for power systems requir-
ing a solution in real-time. This section describes a method for decomposing
the LP into smaller problems that are more computationally tractable and
can easily be parallelized for greater speed, and a method for solving these
decomposed problems is described in Section 4.1.













subject to Ax0 ≤ b,
Akx0 +Ekxk ≤ bk,
k = 1, . . . , K.
(4.1)
Observe that x1, . . . ,xK are independent of one another, both in the objective
and constraints. One can exploit this property by decomposing the problem
in a way that a master problem interacts with the following subproblems
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subject to Akx0 +Ekxk ≤ bk.
(4.3)
The following section presents the critical region exploration (CRE) algo-
rithms for solving these decomposed linear programs.
4.1 Critical region exploration
The CRE algorithm expounded in [21] adopts a technique exploiting the
properties of multi-parametric linear programming. Properties of Jk∗ are
crucial to describe our algorithm. Additional notation is needed to describe
them. Define
X0 := {x | Ax ≤ b} .
Assume throughout that (4.3) is feasible for any x0 ∈ X0. A collection of
polyhedral sets S1, . . . ,SL define a polyhedral partition of S, if all of the L
sets are polyhedral, their union spans S, and they only intersect possibly at
their boundaries. One such example is provided in Figure 4.1. Given this
definition, a vital property of Jk∗ is recorded in the following lemma.
Figure 4.1: A graphical illustration of the intersection of critical regions
induced by each sub-problem (4.3) for k = 1, . . . , K.
Lemma 1. Jk∗ (x
0) is piecewise affine over X0 and the sets over which it is
affine describe a polyhedral partition of X0.
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Problem (4.3) is a multiparametric linear program, linearly parameterized
by x0. As a consequence, its proof follows directly from [30, Theorem 7.2].
Hereafter, the sets in the polyhedral partition are called critical regions.
For a given x0 ∈ X0, one can compute the critical region Ck that contains
x0 ∈ X0 and the affine description of the optimal cost Jk∗ over Ck for each
k = 1, . . . , K. More precisely, let the affine description of Jk∗ be given by[
ρk
]ᵀ
x0 + ηk over Ck. The procedure for determining this critical region and
the associated affine cost description is relegated to Appendix A to maintain


















subject to Ax0 ≤ b,
x0 ∈ ∩Kk=1C0k,
(4.4)
i.e., (4.2) with the additional constraint x0 ∈ ∩Kk=1C0k, over which the affine
description of Jk∗ holds. The above problem can be solved as an LP. Assume
that one can determine the lexicographically smallest minimizer of (4.4). This
provides a tie-breaking technique in the case the minimizer is not unique. The
final consideration is a necessary and sufficient condition for [x0]
∗
to be the
minimizer of (4.2). To that end, [x0]
∗










where δJ∗(·) denotes the subdifferential set of the objective function of (4.2)
and NX0 the normal cone of X0. With the notation at hand, Algorithm 1 to
solve (4.1) can now be presented.
The following result sums up the crucial property of our algorithm.
Proposition 2. Algorithm 1 converges to an optimizer of (4.1) in finitely
many iterations.
The proof is largely similar to that of [21, Theorem 1], and is omitted for
brevity. For that proof technique to work, it is crucial that all variables in
(4.2) and (4.3) remain bounded. Recall that (3.1) was reformulated as (3.3)
and eventually as (4.1). Variable z in (3.3) in general is not bounded. The
definition of CVaR allows us to bound z by the minimum and the maximum
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Algorithm 1 Solving the risk-sensitive security-constrained optimal power
flow problem
1: Initialize:
x0 ∈ X0, J∗ ←∞,D← empty set, ε←
small positive number
2: do
3: Given x0, compute ρk, ηk,Ck for k = 1, . . . , K.
4: Solve (4.4).
5: [x0]
opt ← lexicographically smallest minimizer of step 4.
6: Jopt ← optimal cost of step 4.
7: if Jopt < J∗ then
8: [x0]
∗ ← [x0]opt , J∗ ← Jopt,D← {c}.
9: else
10: D← D ∪ {c0 + α′∑Kk=1 ρk}.
11: end if
12: v∗ ← argminv∈conv(D)+NX0([x0]∗) ‖v‖
2
13: x0 ← [x0]opt − εv∗
14: while v∗ 6= 0
value of C across contingencies. Since these costs are defined over compact
sets, they remain bounded, and therefore, one can restrict z to an interval










Figure 4.2: A graphical illustration of the intersection of critical regions
induced by each sub-problem (4.3) for k = 1, . . . , K.
Consider the example in Figure 4.2 to illustrate the intuition behind the
CRE algorithm. The process begins with an initial point, x0. The critical
region containing x0, C1, is then computed and (4.4) is solved using the
properties of C1. The result is the vertex xm, which is then perturbed into a
neighboring unexplored critical region to x1. Once again, the critical region
containing x1, C2, is computed and its properties are used to solve (4.4),
resulting in x∗. This is the optimal solution to this problem. However in
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order to ensure that this is the case, one must explore all neighboring critical
regions. So the process is repeated, where x∗ is perturbed to x2, and C4
is determined and used to solve (4.4). Now all neighboring critical regions
have been explored and therefore x∗ is the solution. Notice, while there are
four partitions in this example, only three needed to be explored in order to
determine the optimal solution. If the initial point had been within C2 or
C4, neither C1 nor C3 would have needed to be explored.
4.1.1 Selecting parameter ε
Selection of the parameter ε in Algorithm 1 is the most significant diffi-
culty in implementing CRE. From a theoretical perspective, ε taken to be
arbitrarily small should be sufficient for convergence of the algorithm. In
practice, however, ε is restricted by both solver precision and size of critical
regions. The case of the former arises in Step 12 of Algorithm 1. This step
can be formulated as a quadratic program (QP) and is frequently solved us-
ing interior-point methods which result in inexact solutions. When ε is set
smaller than the precision of the QP solver, it is possible for the new point to
lie in the same critical region as the previous point. Thus, the CRE algorithm
will be unable to escape the same critical region and will cycle indefinitely
without achieving the optimal point. On the other hand, the value of ε is
upper-bounded by the size of the neighboring critical regions. If ε is set larger
than any of the neighboring critical regions, then the next iterate may skip
over a critical region and explore a non-adjacent region. The algorithm’s
guarantees cannot be maintained without systematic exploration of critical




The proposed R-SCED formulation with the CRE algorithm was tested on
the IEEE 14-bus and 30-bus test networks. Both cases were taken from
the highly-loaded examples in PGLIB v17.08 [31]. Credible contingencies
included any single line failure except those that would result in islanding in
the network.
All problems were formulated in Python and suitably utilized a C++ based
implementation of CRE. Linear programs and quadratic programs computed
within CRE were solved by Gurobi 8.0 through its C++ interface. Sim-
ulations were performed on a 2015 Macbook Pro with a 2.7 GHz Core i5
processor and 8 GM of RAM. The subproblem constraints were augmented
with slack variables to ensure feasibility.
For both test cases, the drastic action and short-term emergency limits
were assumed to be 70% and 10% higher than the nominal limits, respectively.
The cost associated with regulation was assumed to be equal to the nominal
cost of generation.
5.1 IEEE 14-bus network results
The first example we consider is the IEEE 14-bus test network shown in
Figure 5.1. The generation costs were augmented to $20, 25, 35, 40, 45 per
MWh at buses 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 respectively, and the generation capacity limits at
buses 3, 6, 8 were increased from 0 to 1. The set of contingencies included all
single line outages except the line between buses 7 and 8 which would result
in islanding. Each contingency is assumed to occur with probability 0.005.
The VoLL was set uniformly at $90/MWh. While the VoLL is typically much
higher, it is taken low for illustrative purposes.
Figure 5.2a shows that the nominal cost of generation and total load shed
20
Figure 5.1: IEEE 14-bus test network.
























































Figure 5.2: Performance of R-SCED for the IEEE 14-bus test network as a
function of α, where (a) shows the effect on ( ) nominal dispatch cost and
( ) total load shed across contingencies and (b) shows the runtime.
are piecewise constant, as expected from Proposition 1. As the risk aversion
parameter α increases to 1, the nominal cost of generation generally increases
and the total load shed generally decreases. However, this behavior is not
monotonic. Notice that for α ≈ 0.96, the quantity of total load shed in-
creases as α increases. Each contingency has costs associated with load shed
and regulation. In this example, the comparatively low VoLL allows for an
increase in load shed for a larger decrease in regulation costs. This behavior
is explored in greater detail on the IEEE 30-bus test network in Section 5.2.
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5.2 IEEE 30-bus network results
Figure 5.3: IEEE 30-bus test network.
The IEEE 14-bus network considered above had a solution that was able to
meet demand without any load shed, however this is not always the case. We
consider the highly-loaded IEEE 30-bus test network, shown in Figure 5.3, to
understand the case when the traditional C-SCED formulation is infeasible.
For this system, load shedding is imperative to ensure feasibility of the C-
SCED problem. The system was augmented with generation capacity at
buses 13, 22, 23, and 27 increased from 0 to 3 and cost of $1.4, 1.8, 1.6, 1.7
per MWh, respectively. Line limits were modified as given in Table 5.1 and
VoLL was assumed to be $90/MWh at all buses. The probability of each line
failing was assumed to be uniformly 0.001.
22
Table 5.1: Augmented line limits for IEEE 30-bus example.






















































































Figure 5.4: Solutions of R-SCED for IEEE 30-bus test network with
uniform VoLL of (a) $90/MWh and (b) $126/MWh. Each figure shows ( )
nominal dispatch cost, ( ) total load shed, and ( ) maximum load shed.
Figure 5.4 shows the results of R-SCED over the IEEE 30-bus test net-
work. Per Proposition 1, the nominal dispatch cost and the quantity of load
shed are piecewise constant. As α increases to 1, the nominal dispatch cost
generally increases, however the quantity of total load shed does not gen-
erally decrease. Instead, the maximum load shed generally decreases. This
behavior can be explained using the properties of CVaR. Recall that CVaR
minimizes the expected tail loss and only considers cases whose cost exceeds
a certain threshold. Contingencies whose cost is less than this threshold are
ignored for the purpose of determining the optimal dispatch. Due to the com-
paratively higher cost associated with load shed, the cost threshold is defined
at a point that allows for some level of load shed. Lower cost contingencies
are able to shed a similar level of load if they are able to compensate by suf-
ficiently reducing regulation to ensure the cost remains below this threshold.
As a result, R-SCED allows a small quantity of load shed in contingencies
with relatively low associated costs, as long as the cost of the contingency
23
remains below the threshold.
Similar to the IEEE 14-bus test case, the cost of nominal dispatch does not
increase monotonically and the cost of load shed does not decrease monoton-
ically with α. The objective of R-SCED balances the costs associated with
load shed and regulation. This balance is captured through the VoLL. When
the VoLL increases, as in Figure 5.4b, the total quantity of load shed no
longer increases as dramatically with α. Instead, the load shed and nominal
cost of generation are more similar to the IEEE 14-bus test case in which
the load shed generally decreased and nominal cost of generation generally
increased with the parameter α.











Figure 5.5: Runtime of R-SCED via CRE for VoLL of ( ) $90/MWh and
( ) $126/MWh.
The runtime of CRE for this problem is shown in Figure 5.5. For both
cases, the time remains relatively constant for low α and increases with α.
Intuition suggests that this increase in runtime is a product of the initial
condition. As the initial condition deviates farther from the optimal solution,
there are a greater number of critical regions between the initial point and
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APPENDIX A
DETERMINING THE CRITICAL REGION
PARAMETERS
The critical region exploration algorithm presented requires determination
of the affine cost structure and region over which the cost holds for each











subject to Akx0 +Ekxk ≤ bk.
(A.1)
Consider fixed x0. Assume that the minimizer xk∗ (x
0) is unique and sup-
press the dependency on x0 for convenience. At the optimum, only a subset
of the constraints are active, or bound by equality, and the rest are inactive.













where A and I denote the set of active and inactive constraints, respectively.
The critical region is defined over a constant active set. Initially, assume EkA











































1This assumption allows for greater conceptual clarity and is often true in practice.
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Recall the critical region is defined over a constant active set. Therefore, it
is the region over which the inactive set remains inactive, or
Pk :=
{
x0 | AkIx0 +EkIxk∗ < bkI
}
,


















A.1 Critical region parameters under degeneracy
The previous section assumed invertibility of EkA. However, primal and dual
degeneracy frequently arise when solving R-SCED. To circumvent this issue,
consider the QR decomposition of EkA
EkA := Q
(




where Q is orthonormal and U 1 is full-rank and upper triangular matrix.
For convenience, let r denote the rank of EkA, and equivalently the dimension
of U 1. Partition x and c accordingly where subscript 1 denotes the first r







where P 1 and p1 have r rows. Suppressing the subscript ∗ in xk∗, (A.2a) can
then be expressed as
(
P 1 U 1 U 2











From the first row,
xk1 = [U 1]
−1 (p1 −P 1x0 −U 2xk2) .
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−1 (p1 −P 1x0 −U 2xk2) .









The critical region is the intersection of set where the inactive constraints


















)∣∣∣∣∣(AkI −F 1 [U 1]−1P 1)x0 + (F 2 −F 1 [U 1]−1U 2)x2 < bkI −F 1 [U 1]−1 p1
}
.
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